fix(cli): detect URL-encoded attacks and stop leaking Invalid Date in log-parser#42
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ralyodio merged 1 commit intoJul 2, 2026
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… log-parser
Two correctness bugs in the log/attack parser (the actual product):
1. detectAttackPattern tested the raw nginx request path, which nginx logs
URL-encoded. Plaintext signatures like '<script' or 'or 1=1' therefore
never matched an encoded payload ('%3Cscript%3E', '%27%20OR%201=1') — a
silent false negative in a security product. Now test the raw value and
its URL-decoded forms (single + double encoding), guarding malformed '%'
sequences.
2. parseNginxTimestamp/parseSyslogTimestamp wrapped new Date() in try/catch
with a new Date() fallback, but new Date(<bad>) returns an Invalid Date
instead of throwing, so the catch never fired and Invalid Date leaked into
downstream time-window logic. Check getTime() explicitly. Also fix the
syslog year assumption so a December log parsed in January is dated to the
previous year rather than a full year in the future.
Logic verified standalone (encoded SQLi/XSS/traversal detected, benign path
still null, malformed input safe, timestamps never Invalid).
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Problem
Two correctness bugs in
apps/cli/src/core/log-parser.ts(see #41):detectAttackPatternruns plaintext signatures against the nginx request path, which is stored URL-encoded (parseNginxLog→path: match[4]). So%3Cscript%3E,%27%20OR%201=1,%2e%2e%2f…are never flagged — a silent false negative in a security product.parseNginxTimestamp/parseSyslogTimestamprely ontry/catcharoundnew Date(), butnew Date(<bad>)returns an Invalid Date rather than throwing, so the fallback is dead code and Invalid Date propagates into time-window logic.parseSyslogTimestampalso hard-codes the current year (December-log-in-January is misdated a year into the future).Fix
detectAttackPattern: test the raw path and its URL-decoded forms (single + double encoding), guarding malformed%with a try/catch arounddecodeURIComponent.Number.isNaN(d.getTime())explicitly and fall back to now; for syslog, choose the most recent non-future year.Verification
The CLI package has no test runner, so I verified the logic with a standalone script: plaintext SQLi still detected; URL-encoded SQLi/XSS/path-traversal now detected (including double-encoded); benign path →
null; malformed%doesn't throw; valid and garbage timestamps both yield a validDate(never Invalid). Type-safe (passestsc --noEmit).Note: scanning
user_agentfor payloads is a small follow-up inmonitor.ts(the caller) and is out of scope for this parser-only PR.Fixes #41.